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SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
Dawson v. Higgins4 2
(decided April 5, 1994)
Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a New York City
rent-control provision prohibiting landlords from evicting
tenants, for the landlord's personal use, who have occupied their
apartment for twenty years or more, 4 3 as a taking of property
without just compensation, 4 4 as well as a violation of due process
rights and the prohibition against involuntary servitude. 4 5 The
court held that the regulations did not violate either the State or
Federal Constitutions because they did not amount to a physical

42. 197 A.D.2d 127, 610 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1st Dep't 1994).
43. See NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE & CHARTER § 26408(b)(1) (1993). Section 26-408(b)(1) provides in pertinent part:
The landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession of a housing
accommodation because of immediate and compelling necessity for his
or her own personal use and occupancy or for the use and occupancy of
his or her immediate family provided, however, that this subdivision
shall not apply where a member of the household lawfully occupying the
housing accommodation is sixty-two years of age or older, has been a
tenant in a housing accommodation in that building for twenty years or
more, or has an impairment which results from anatomical,
physiological or psychological conditions.
Id.; see also N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2204.5(a) (1987). The
rules and regulations of New York State provide language similar to that of the
New York City Administrative Code without any substantial deviation.
44. U.S. CoNST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7(a) ("Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.").
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.").
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taking of property without just compensation, and that the due
process and involuntary servitude claims were frivolous. 46
In November, 1983, plaintiff Joan Dawson purchased a five
story brownstone in Manhattan which housed two rent-controlled
48
tenants. 4 7 Both tenants have lived in the building since 1970.
At the time of the purchase, both tenants could have been evicted
for the landlord's personal use or that of her family, so long as
an immediate and compelling need was demonstrated in good
faith. 49
In 1984, the eviction provisions of the rent control laws
regarding owner-occupancy evictions were amended to prohibit
tenants from being displaced who are disabled, age sixty-two or
older, or have been living twenty or more years in the building. 50
The plaintiff, Joan Dawson, brought this action against both New
York City and the Division of Housing and Community Renewal,
which administers New York City's rent-control regulations. 5 1 It
was asserted by the plaintiff that the bar to eviction was a
regulatory taking of property without just compensation, violative
of both State and Federal Constitutions. 52 It was also asserted
that the bar to eviction violated the plaintiff's due process rights,
and the inability of the landlord to withdraw from the rental
53
business amounted to involuntary servitude.
The court stated that the major cases that invalidated housing
regulations were distinguished from the instant case by the lower
court under the Takings Clause because the instant case involved
a pre-existing relationship that the owner voluntarily entered into
when purchasing the building. 54 The case at bar differed from

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Dawson, 197 A.D.2d at 138, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 208-09.
Id. at 129-30, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 203.
Id.
Id. at 130, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 203-04.
Id. at 131, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 204.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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cases such as Seawall Associates v. City of New York, 55 in which
regulations were held to be a physical taking, forcing owners to
accept people as tenants, and denying owners the right to
56
exclude, an essential right of private property ownership.
Forcing a property owner to accept strangers on the property is
different than protecting existing tenants, as was held in the
instant case.
The court also cited Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp.,57 where the United States Supreme Court stated that even
a small physical invasion of property, relative to the size of the
property, was still a physical taking. 5 8 The Loretto Court stated
that while the state has the right under eminent domain to take
private property, or delegate such a taking to an agency or third
party, it must pay a reasonable price for the property in order to
comply with both the Federal and State Constitutions. 59 In
another major case distinguished from the instant case by the
lower court, Armstrong v. United States,60 the Supreme Court
held that the Fifth Amendment's guarantee prohibiting the

government from taking property without just compensation was
created in order to restrain the government from "forcing some
55. 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1989). In
Seawall, plaintiffs challenged a local law "as an unconstitutional taking of
private property without just compensation." Id. at 99, 542 N.E.2d at 1061,
544 N.Y.S.2d at 544. The owners of single-room occupancy [hereinafter SRO]
properties were required to repair and offer for rent all vacant units or pay
penalties up to $150,000 per unit. Id. at 100, 542 N.E.2d at 1061, 544
N.Y.S.2d at 544. Many SRO's were purchased with the intent to demolish
them and build other structures, and the City of New York attempted to force
the owners to rent them by issuing heavy fines for warehousing, as well as
ordering a moratorium on SRO demolitions. Id. at 99-101, 542 N.E.2d at
1061-62, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 544-45. The exceptions to these regulations were
cases of extreme hardship, or by paying a $45,000 per unit buyout to the city.
Id. at 100-01, 542 N.E.2d at 1061, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
56. Id. at 102, 542 N.E.2d at 1063, 74 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
57. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
58. Id. at 436-37 (stating that "[clonstitutional protection for the rights of
private property cannot be made to depend on the size of the area permanently
occupied").
59. Id. at 441.
60. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
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people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice. should be borne by the public as a whole." 6 1
The plaintiffs, in part, claimed "that the challenged regulations
frustrate their reasonable investment-back expectation of being
able to evict their tenants." 62 In Birnbaum v. State,63 the court
held a requirement that a nursing home give the Commissioner of
Health ninety days notice of its intention to close, and the written
approval of such intention, did not constitute a taking of property
even though the nursing home operated at a loss. 64 The plaintiff,
who brought the action as executor of the Birnbaum estate to
protect its assets, argued that forcing the operator to continue
operations at a loss depleted the assets of the estate. 65 Justice
Holmes in Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commission of
Louisiana,66 stated that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause
means that one "cannot be compelled to carry on even a branch
of a business at a loss, much less the whole business." 67 That
rationale, however, was rejected in Birnbaum because it was not
a per se taking in an industry subject to extensive regulation, and
an administrative procedure is in existence to terminate the
business in an orderly fashion for the benefit of the public. 68 The
operators could not be forced to lose money indefinitely. 69 The
rent control regulations in the instant case did not force the
owners to operate at a loss. The court pointed out that plaintiffs
have not "given any hint as to the economic impact of the
regulations on their property."70 Moreover, there is a
requirement in the statute that the landlords make a reasonable
61. Id. at 49. The Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee is applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. B. & Q.
R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897).
62. Dawson, 197 A.D.2d at 136, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 207.

63. 73 N.Y.2d 638, 541 N.E.2d 23, 543 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1989).
64. Id. at 647, 541 N.E.2d at 27, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
65. Id. at 641-42, 541 N.E.2d at 24, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
66. 251 U.S. 396 (1920).

67. Id. at 399.
68. Binibaum, 73 N.Y.2d at 648, 541 N.E.2d at 28, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
69. Id.
70. Dawson, 197 A.D.2d at 137, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 208.
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rate of return (8.5%) and can apply to have the rents raised if
1
they can show necessity. 7
In its analysis, the Dawson court also noted the case of Rent
Stabilization Ass'n of New York City, Inc. v. Higgins,72 where
the landlords claimed that the enlargement of the class of people
defined as family members eligible for rent-control protection
constituted a physical taking of their property because the newly
defined extended family members might be strangers. 73 It was
claimed that this created a perpetual tenancy. 74 The New York
Court of Appeals rejected both assertions because the extended
family member had to live at the premises for a period of time
prior to the original tenant vacating, and also noted that an
indefinite tenancy is not a perpetual one. 75
Whether a regulation creates a perpetual tenancy that
constitutes a taking has been brought before the courts on several
occasions. 76 In Yee v. City of Escondido,77 the Supreme Court
noted, in dicta, that if a landowner was compelled to provide a
perpetual tenancy, the constitutionality of the statute should be
questioned. 78 The Dawson court distinguished Yee because, in
the instant case, the regulations did not force a landlord to remain
in perpetuity in the rental market. 7 9 The court noted that the
plaintiff could sell her property at any time, and that she had

71. Id. at 130-31, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 203-04.
72. 83 N.Y.2d 156, 630 N.E.2d 626, 608 N.Y.S.2d 930 (1993).
73. Id. at 171, 630 N.E.2d at 632, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
74. Id. at 171-72, 630 N.E.2d at 632, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
75. Id. at 171-73, 630 N.E.2d at 632-33, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 936-37.
76. See, e.g., People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N.Y.
429, 130 N.E. 601 (1921) (dismissing a perpetual tenancy claim because the
"September housing laws" passed in 1920 were only a temporary two year
regulation); Sobel v. Higgins, 188 A.D.2d 286, 590 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1st Dep't
1992) (rejecting an assertion that a statutory protection of residents who had
occupied their apartments for 20 years or more constituted a perpetual tenancy
because the property was purchased with rent-controlled tenants occupying the
premises).
77. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
78. Dawson, 197 A.D.2d at 133-34. 610 N.Y.S.2d at 206.
79. Id. at 134, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 206.
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purchased the property knowing that it was subject to
regulation. 80
On both the federal and state level there have been various
landlord-tenant cases affirming the right to regulate housing. In
Pennell v. City of San Jose,81 the Supreme Court. noted that
"'[s]tates have broad power to regulate housing conditions in
general and the landlord-tenant relationship in particular without
paying compensation for all economic injuries that such
regulations entails.' 82 In Bowles v. Willingham,83 the Court
upheld a wartime restriction on the price of rental housing where
defense activities created a sharp increase in demand that resulted
in large rent increases. 84 The New York Court of Appeals also
held, in Spring Realty Co. v. New York City Loft Board,85 that
protection for loft residents did not constitute a taking of
86
landlord's property.
There could also be a regulatory taking of property requiring
just compensation. This occurs when governmental restrictions
on property prohibit the owner from realizing any viable use of
the property. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,87 the United
States Supreme Court held that if a regulation goes too far, the
action of the government will be treated as a taking and will
demand just compensation. 8 8 The Supreme Court also noted, in
United States v. General Motors Corp,89 that governmental
action not reaching the level of acquisition or occupation will
result in a taking provided that the effect of the government's
actions "are so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of
his interest in the property." 90
80. Id. at 138-39. 610 N.Y.S.2d at 208-09.
81. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
82. Id. at 12 n.6 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982)).
83. 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
84. Id. at 514-16.
85. 69 N.Y.2d 657, 503 N.E.2d 1367, 511 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1986).
86. Id. at 659, 503 N.E.2d at 1368, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
87. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
88. Id. at415.
89. 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
90. Id. at 378.
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In de St. Aubin v. Flacke,9 1 the New York Court of Appeals
affirmed the notion that a taking can occur by restrictions on use,
but noted that state regulations carry a strong presumption of
constitutionality and that every element of the petitioner's claim
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 92 The regulations are
otherwise justified if they are rationally "related to the public
health, safety and welfare and are not confiscatory." 93 The court
also noted that even a substantial diminution in the value of the
property does not, by itself, present prime facie evidence of a
taking of property. 94 In the instant case, the Dawson court stated
that plaintiffs had failed to meet the de St. Aubin burden. 95
In holding the plaintiff's involuntary servitude claim to be
frivolous, 9 6 the court cited to Sobel v. Higgins,9 7 where a

landlord claimed that the rent-control eviction provisions forced a
landlord to remain in the housing market, and were thus, a form
of involuntary servitude. 98 Analogous to the case at bar, since the

plaintiff had voluntarily purchased the property with existing
tenants on the premises and could choose to sell the property at

91. 68 N.Y.2d 66, 496 N.E.2d 879, 505 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1986).
92. Id. at 76, 496 N.E.2d at 885, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 76-77, 496 N.E.2d at 885, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 865. See, e.g.,
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (stating that an 87% diminution
in property value did not create a presumption of a taking of property). •
95. Dawson, 197 A.D.2d at 136, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 207. The Dawson court
cited Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Debenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987),
as an illustration of a case where government action was claimed to be a
regulatory taking, but similar to the instant case, was determined not to be a
regulatory taking. Dawson, 197 A.D.2d at 135, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 207. In
Keystone, a Pennsylvania regulation required that 50% of the coal could not be
mined beneath structures identified by the statute to prevent cave-ins in the
interest of health and safety of the public. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 470. The
Supreme Court held that the regulations were not a taking, and compared the
restriction on mining to other zoning ordinances which limit the owner's
profitability of some of their property. Id. at 498.
96. Dawson, 197 A.D.2d at 138, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 208-09.
97. 188 A.D.2d 286, 590 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1st Dep't 1992).
98. Id. at 287, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
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any time if she wished to leave the housing business, the claim
was deemed frivolous. 99
The court also held that the due process claim was frivolous
because rent-control regulations concerning evictions are within
the scope of the state's permissible police powers. 10 0 Such
regulations are economic and, therefore, the legitimate state
interest of preserving affordable housing, and stopping the
devastating displacement of elderly, disabled, and long-term
(twenty years or more) tenants rationally relates the law to that
interest. 101
In the case of Loab Estates, Inc. v. Druze,102 a temporary
restraint on landlords prohibiting them from demolishing rental
buildings with existing tenants or forcing them to find the tenants
comparable housing at their current rent was held not to be a
violation of the landlord's due process rights because the state
police powers were used to alleviate an emergency situation and
103
the restraint was not permanent.
In Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York, 104 a law requiring the utility to
transport gas purchased by the customer, which was not from the
utility's normal source, depriving the company of the customary
mark-up in price as a "middle-man," did not violate the due
process rights of the utility. 105 They were allowed to charge a
reasonable rate for transporting the gas, and only had to provide
for such transport when it was not burdening the utility or other
rate payers. 10 6 The legislation was economic and was rationally

99. Id. at 287-88, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 885. See Recknagel v. Finkelstein. 275
A.D.2d 684, 86 N.Y.S.2d 611 (2d Dep't 1949) (stating that a landlord's
involuntary servitude assertion concerning rent regulations was without merit).
100. Dmvson, 197 A.D.2d at 138, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
101. Id. at 138, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 208.
102. 300 N.Y. 176, 90 N.E.2d 25 (1949).
103. Id. at 180, 90 N.E.2d at 26.
104. 71 N.Y.2d 313, 520 N.E.2d 528, 525 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1988).
105. Id. at 323-25, 520 N.E.2d at 532-34, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 814-15.
106. Id. at 324-25, 520 N.E.2d at 533-34, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 814-15.
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related to a legitimate state interest of allowing the development
7
of New York State natural gas sources. 10
Therefore, under both the New York Constitution and the
United States Constitution, housing regulations barring evictions
of long-term, disabled or elderly tenants do not constitute a
taking of property without just compensation. The regulations
neither violate due process nor compel a landlord to perform
involuntary servitude.

107. Id. at 321-22, 520 N.E.2d at 531-32, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 812-13.
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